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I. Introduction 
China is undergoing industrialization and modernization at a scale and speed the world 
has never witnessed before.  Since its economic reform in 1978, China has experienced more 
than three decades of exceptional economic growth, at a rate three times faster than the world 
average.1  The country is currently the world’s second largest economy after the United States 
and the largest exporter of goods.2   
However, accompanying China’s astounding development is a whole host of 
environmental and sustainability problems.  In the past fifty years, temperature has increased 
0.26 and 0.18 °C per decade in eastern and western China, respectively, and sea level has risen 
0.1-0.25 centimeters per year.3  Internally, China’s leaders are especially concerned about the 
impact of climate change on political stability, fearing that its failure to protect the environment 
might “someday serve as the catalyst for broad-based demands for political change.”4  Indeed, 
that someday may have already arrived.  For instance, central and eastern China is currently 
choking on smog.  Of 74 Chinese cities which started reporting levels of PM2.5, also known as 
fine particles, in the beginning of this year, 33 have taken readings of over 300 micrograms per 
cubic meter in the first two weeks.5  The World Health Organization recommends 24-hour 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jianguo Liu & Peter H. Raven, China’s Environmental Challenges and Implications for the 
World, 40 CRITICAL REVIEWS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 823, 825 (2010). 
2 World Economic Outlook: Hopes, Realities, and Risks, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
(April 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/index.htm.  
3 Liu, supra note 1, at 823. 
4 Elizabeth C. Economy, The Great Leap Backward?, 86 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 38, 47 
(September/October 2007); see also Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy 
Change in China, 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1805 (2008). 
5 Nan Xu & Chun Zhang, How Did China’s Air Pollution Get This Bad?, CHINADIALOGUE.COM 
(January 14, 2013). 
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exposure to PM2.5 levels of no higher than 25.6  According to Chen Jiping, a former leading 
member of the Party’s Committee of Political and Legislative Affairs, pollution has replaced 
land disputes as the main cause of social unrest in China.7  Externally, China also faces ever 
mounting pressure from the international community to meaningfully combat climate change, 
especially after having surpassed the United States in 2009 (possibly earlier) to become the 
world’s largest carbon emitter.8   
This paper focuses on one of China’s efforts to engage with climate change—the 
establishment and development of carbon emissions trading schemes (ETSs) in the country.  
Section II examines the shift from command and control approaches to market mechanisms in 
China’s climate policy over the past two decades, which primed the domestic scene for the 
emergence of carbon emissions trading.  Section III studies the seven regional ETS pilots due to 
launch later this year, the success or failure of which will to a large extent determine the future of 
carbon markets in not only China, but most likely the rest of the world.  Finally, section IV 
discusses the barriers these pilot programs need to overcome, and provides some suggestions for 
China to move forward and achieve its goal of establishing a nationwide scheme by 2015-16. 
 
 
II. China’s Shift Towards a Market-Based Environmental Policy 
It is worth noting that the concept of emissions trading is not completely new in China.  
As early as 1990 the United States and China worked together on the feasibility of sulphur 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Xin Zhou, Chinese Anger Over Pollution Becomes Main Cause of Social Unrest, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (March 6, 2013). 
7  Id. 
8 See, e.g., Stian Reklev, Global CO2 Emissions Rise 3 Percent in 2011, REUTERS (July 19, 
2012); see also Karl Hallding et al., China’s Climate- and Energy-Security Dilemma: Shaping a 
New Path of Economic Growth, 38 JOURNAL OF CURRENT CHINESE AFFAIRS 119, 121-123 (2009). 
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trading within the country, culminating in a memorandum of understanding9 and the completion 
of two phases of sulphur emission trading pilots in four provinces, nine cities, and one trans-
regional Chinese power enterprise.10  On the one hand, these pilot projects revealed many 
negative features of emissions trading in China: trading was based on “instructive price” instead 
of “market price”; allocation methods were highly variable and not transparent; no formal legal 
provision existed that directly governed the implementation of emissions trading; and the lack of 
a system of independent professional consultants and service providers such as auditors and 
brokers under the Chinese command and control approach has raised further questions of market 
integrity and efficiency.11  On the other hand, these trading pilots have significantly contributed 
to building the foundation of emissions trading in China, most importantly by initiating an 
ideological change among stakeholders to recognize that they can no longer pollute at will, and 
that pollution costs may have to be internalized.12 
China has also had some experience with the carbon market specifically, mostly through 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM is an offset 
market in which developed countries obtain “carbon credits,” also known as certified emission 
credits (CERs), by implementing a project in a developing country that reduces domestic 
emissions relative to an agreed and verified baseline.13  After endorsing the CDM in 2004, China 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Clean Air Market Partnerships – China, EPA.GOV (2003), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/international/china/index.html.  
10 Julia Tao, Between Market and State: Dilemmas of Environmental Governance in China’s 
Sulphur Dioxide Emission Trading System, 27 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING C: GOVERNMENT 
AND POLICY 175, 176 (2008). 
11 Id. at 180, 181.  See also QIN TIANBAO, CLIMATE CHANGE AND EMISSION TRADING SYSTEMS 
(ETS): CHINA’S PERSPECTIVE AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 57-71 (KAS-Schriftenreihe 
China, 2012). 
12 Tao, supra note 10, at 181. 
13 About CDM, UNFCCC WEBSITE, available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/index.html.  
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very quickly became the dominant CER supplier.14  As of April 30, 2013, a total of 3,554 
Chinese projects have been successfully registered with the CDM Executive Board, accounting 
for 52.6% of the world’s total registered projects.15  To better handle the deluge of CDM 
transactions, China started building domestic capacity and trading infrastructure that would 
eventually be able to manage robust carbon markets.16  For example, the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) began calculating and publishing grid emission factors, an 
essential tool for establishing baseline emissions in any emissions trading scheme.17  In addition, 
beginning in 2008 with the Tianjin Climate Exchange (TCX), China launched and is currently 
developing more than one hundred “climate exchanges,” “carbon exchanges,” or “environment 
exchanges,” all aiming to trade carbon in the future.18  Though the CDM has its fair share of 
limitations and shortcomings, it further prepared China for the establishment of its own domestic 
carbon trading scheme.19  
Despite these past experiments, China’s interest in carbon trading as a means of realizing 
emissions reductions still might come as a surprise to many.  With heavy government 
intervention, significant state ownership of enterprises and a culture of distrust in business, the 
country remains far from a true free-market economy.20  As one source put it, “the idea that a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See, e.g., Zhongxiang Zhang, China in the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy, EAST-WEST 
WORKING PAPERS, February 2010, at 17. 
15 CDM: CDM Insights, UNFCCC WEBSITE, available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/CDMinsights/index.html.  
16 RICHARD SCOTNEY ET AL., CARBON MARKETS AND CLIMATE POLICY IN CHINA: CHINA’S 
PURSUIT OF A CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE 8 (ClimateBridge, 2012) 
17 Id. 
18 GUOYI HAN ET AL., CHINA’S CARBON EMISSION TRADING: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENT 18 (Fores Study, 2012:1). 
19 See, e.g., Scotney, supra note 16, at 8. 
20 Qiang Wang, China Has the Capacity to Lead in Carbon Trading, 493 NATURE 273 (2013). 
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communist country would actively seek to implement market mechanisms seems unlikely.”21  
The country’s environmental policy, like most other development objectives laid down in 
China’s Five Year Plans (FYPs), has for decades been deeply entrenched in a command and 
control system.22  Emission reduction targets are distributed down through the hierarchy from 
central to provincial to local levels, combined to a very limited extent with economic tools such 
as resource taxes, tax breaks, subsidies, and investment programs.23  Thirty years of economic 
reform have increased the role of markets dramatically, yet corresponding reforms of 
administrative systems have been lagging behind, and in many ways there still remains “too 
much government and too little market.”24  For example, the 11th FYP that was in place between 
2006 and 2010 set a mandatory target to reduce energy intensity by 20% from 2005 levels.25  
China managed to achieve a 19.06% reduction by the end of the 11th FYP, but mostly through 
political intervention such as electricity rationing and enforced closure of inefficient power 
plants and factories.26  The Chinese leadership soon realized that, aside from being unsustainable 
over the long term, such draconian top-down measures could result in uneven GDP and job loss 
within sectors and across provinces.27  Consequently, officials and policymakers started placing 
more emphasis on market-based instruments to help achieve energy and carbon intensity targets 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 GEORGE YU & ROB ELSWORTH, TURNING THE TANKER: CHINA’S CHANGING ECONOMIC 
IMPERATIVES AND ITS TENTATIVE LOOK TO EMISSIONS TRADING 15 (Sandbag, April 2012). 
22 Wu Qian, Policy and Politics of a Carbon Market in China, GREENHOUSE GAS MARKET 
REPORT 2011, 22 (2011). 
23 Hallding, supra note 8, at 130. 
24 Id. at 131. 
25 Id. at 127. 
26 Qian, supra note 22, at 22. 
27 Prospects for Carbon Trading in China, THE CLIMATE GROUP POLICY BRIEFING 2 (2010). 
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in cost-effective ways.  This is the context in which the Chinese government announced its intent 
to establish a national carbon trading system by 2015 in its 12th FYP (2011-2015).28  
III. The Seven Regional ETS Pilots 
The central government has decided that NDRC’s climate change department and its 
local affiliations will take the lead, and coordinate with other departments, to implement the ETS 
portion of the 12th FYP.29  In April 2011, NDRC officials announced that pilot carbon trading 
markets will begin in selected cities and provinces, with the hope that actual trading will start as 
early as 2013.30  In November of the same year, the State Council issued a “Workplan for 
Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions during the 12th FYP,” in which the need to establish 
carbon trading schemes was highlighted.31  Immediately following the release of the Workplan, 
in mid-November, NDRC officially approved carbon trading pilots in seven provinces and cities: 
Beijing, Guangdong, Tianjin, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Hubei, and Chongqing.32  The seven pilot 
sites were selected to reflect the regional diversity in terms of economic activity and 
development, allowing China to test various emissions trading models and gather experience on 
a municipal and provincial level before any such scheme is scaled up to a national level.33  It is 
forecasted that with these pilot programs up and running, China will regulate 800 million to 1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 MARK FULTON, 12TH FIVE YEAR PLAN—CHINESE LEADERSHIP TOWARDS A LOW CARBON 
ECONOMY 1 (Deutsche Bank Group, 2011). 
29 Qian, supra note 22, at 23. 
30 China Planning Emissions Trading in 6 Regions—Point Carbon, Reuters (April 11, 2011), 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/11/china-carbon-trading-
idAFL3E7FB1Q320110411.  
31 Factbox: China’s Carbon Market Plans, Reuters (November 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/10/china-carbon-idAFL3E7L41ON20111110.  
32 HAN, supra note 18, at 23. 
33 Rob Elsworth, Trading Places?, CHINADIALOGUE.COM (May 17, 2012). 
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billion metric tons of emissions by 2015, making it the world’s second biggest cap-and-trade 
program after the EU ETS.34 
In July 2012, NDRC released a new set of regulations entitled “The Interim Regulation of 
Voluntary Greenhouse Gases Emission Trading in China,” which set out a series of standards 
that regional governments must follow as they set up carbon trading schemes.35  Specifically, the 
regulation applies to the trading activities of the following 6 GHGs: CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, 
PFCs and SF6.36  The new rules also promote a series of standardized methodologies “recorded 
by NDRC”37 that cover how to “set up the baseline, to demonstrate the additionality, to calculate 
the emission reductions, to make the measurement plan, etc.”38  It seems that they are largely 
modeled after CDM methodologies, and NDRC has employed experts to ensure that they suit the 
needs of Chinese voluntary trading schemes.39  Another noteworthy provision in the Interim 
Regulation details how all emission reductions delivered through voluntary carbon markets must 
be recorded by NDRC and independently validated by qualified validation organizations that 
have been approved by the Commission.40  Finally, the Interim Regulation introduced the China 
Certified Emissions Reduction (CCER) mechanism, which provides qualified offset credits to the 
domestic carbon market.41 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 China Zone Sets Date for Carbon Trading Start, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (April 5, 
2013). 
35 James Murray, New Regulations Lay Groundwork for Chinese Carbon Market, 
BUSINESSGREEN.COM (July 10, 2012). 
36 The Interim Regulation of Voluntary Greenhouse Gases Emission Trading in China, § 2 
(2012) [hereinafter Interim Regulation]. 
37 Id. § 9. 
38 Id. § 10. 
39 See Interim Regulation, § 10. 
40 See Interim Regulation, § 12. 
41 See Interim Regulation, § 21. 
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Under the guidance of these new regulations, all pilot programs are required to submit 
proposals explaining how carbon emissions targets will be allocated, establish a dedicated fund 
to support the carbon trade market, and present detailed implementation plans for approval by 
the State Council by the end of 2012.42  The following subsections will look at the progress made 
so far in each of these pilot project regions. 
Beijing 
From 2006 to 2010, Beijing has increased its energy efficiency by 26.59% from 2005 
levels, making it the most energy-efficient region in the country.43  It has achieved this mainly 
through the relocation of heavy industry, higher GDP contributions from a larger service industry, 
diversification of energy consumption patterns and the application of energy-efficient 
technology.44  Under the 12th FYP period, the capital is assigned an ambitious target of a 17% 
increase in energy efficiency and an 18% reduction in carbon intensity.45   
The Beijing municipal government released draft rules for its pilot carbon trading scheme 
on March 28, 2012, which contained details regarding the allocation of permits, use of offsets, 
and price control mechanisms.46  According to the rules, more than 600 companies with direct 
and indirect carbon emission exceeding 10,000 tons per year will be included on a mandatory list 
for capping emissions.47  It is so far unclear exactly which sectors are covered, but Point Carbon, 
a consulting firm that tracks and analyzes carbon markets, reported that thermal electricity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 HAN, supra note 18, at 23. 
43 YU, supra note 21, at 16. 
44 Id. 
45 Announcement on the Results of Each Region in Meeting the Energy Conservation Target 
During the 11th Five Year Plan, NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA (2011), available at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjdt/zygg/gjtjjgg/t20110610_402731394.htm	  (in Chinese).  
46 Beijing Releases Draft Rules for Emissions Trading Scheme, POINT CARBON (March 28, 2012).  
Point Carbon requires subscription to access this article, and it doesn’t seem like the Beijing 
Draft Rules are publicly available yet. 
47 Lan Lan, Beijing Preparing for Carbon Trading System, CHINA DAILY (April 20, 2012). 
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providers, the heating sector, manufacturers and major public buildings have already been asked 
to provide emissions data for the period between 2009 and 2010.48  Furthermore, the municipal 
government will offer a free quota on the amount of a pollutant that may be emitted by 
companies, although certain industry insiders have suggested leaving about 15% of the overall 
quota for auction, in an effort to build a market-oriented system.49  The overall quota is yet 
undetermined, though it will be closely linked to the city’s target of lowering its carbon intensity 
by 18% during the 12th FYP.50 
Currently, Beijing has made it a top priority to figure out how to calculate the city’s 
indirect carbon emissions, since about 70% of Beijing’s electricity consumption is generated 
outside the capital.51  Due to this peculiar feature, the city’s carbon trading program is likely to 
have two layers: one for direct emissions targeting producers starting in 2013, and the other for 
indirect emissions targeting consumers, possibly to be implemented a year later.52  In order to 
avoid double counting, the direct and indirect emissions markets may be kept as separately 
traded markets, with CCER produced by voluntary emission reduction trading activities available 
to be used as offsets in both markets.53 
To be sure, there still remains a considerable amount of uncertainty surrounding what the 
Beijing carbon trading scheme might eventually look like and how it will work.  Nevertheless, 
Beijing has a sophisticated and informed business community, and one of the leading 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 China: Carbon Offset Market in Sight as Beijing Prepares for Pilot Carbon Trading From 
2013, GLOBAL GREEN POLICY INSIGHTS, June 1, 2012, at 14.	  




53 YU, supra note 21, at 17; Beijing Launched Carbon Emission Trading Pilot Project and 
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environmental exchanges in the country—the China Beijing Environmental Exchange (CBEEX), 
which has been proactive in advocating emission trading as a cost effective means of emissions 
mitigation.54  Among other things, CBEEX was involved in setting up the “Panda Standard,” 
which targets Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) offset projects and generates 
carbon credits for the voluntary market.55   
Guangdong Province 
Guangdong province is a manufacturing hub on China’s southern coast and a main 
thoroughfare to the Pearl River Delta region.  It has the highest carbon emissions of any Chinese 
province—500 million tons of CO2 equivalent per year.56  However, by phasing out or 
retrofitting less energy efficient heavy industry, developing energy consumption monitoring 
systems and mandating energy saving measures in the building and transportation sectors, it is 
the second most energy-efficient region in the country.57  In the 12th FYP, the central government 
gave Guangdong provincial authorities a target to reduce its carbon intensity by 19.5% from 
2005 levels by the end of 2015 and 45% from 2005 levels by the end of 2020.58 
The Guangzhou Institute of Energy Conversion (GIEC) under the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences is in charge of the design and implementation of the Guangdong pilot ETS, while the 
Guangzhou Exchange Services Group (GESG) has been identified to work on the registry 
software design and trading platform, and eventually host trading.59  In September 2012, the 
GIEC released a detailed draft plan for the Guangdong ETS, making Guangdong the first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 YU, supra note 21, at 17 
55 Id. 
56 HAN, supra note 18, at 25. 
57 YU, supra note 21, at 18. 




	   13	  
province to issue ETS regulations.60  According to the draft plan, the Guangdong ETS will cover 
nine industries that altogether account for nearly half of the province’s power consumption—
cement, steel, ceramics, petrochemicals, textiles, nonferrous metals, electricity, plastics and 
paper-making.61  Other sectors, including transportation and construction, may be added to the 
scheme later.62  Companies that emit more than 20,000 tons of CO2 a year will be required to 
participate in the trading scheme, which amounts to 827 companies in the province.63  In 
February of this year, the Development and Reform Commission (DRC) of Guangdong released 
its first list of specific companies required to either participate in emissions trading or to solely 
report their emissions.64  This list includes 310 companies across four industrial sectors—
electricity, cement, steel, and petrochemicals—47% of which are from the cement sector.65  Like 
the EU ETS, these companies will initially be assigned a free quota of carbon credits to use or 
trade.66  Furthermore, the draft plan lays out a three-phase timeline: a testing period in 2012-
2015, an “improvement” period in 2016-2020, and finally full trading after 2020.67  Furthermore, 
Lu Xiulu, Director of the Guangdong DRC, also confirmed an absolute cap of 660 million tons 
of CO2 in 2015—the first quantified cap of any of the seven pilots.68  As a point of comparison, 
the California cap-and-trade program has set a target cap of 334.2 million metric tons of CO2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Joshua Speckman, Guangdong Steps Closer to Carbon Trading Launch, ENVIRONMENTAL 
FINANCE (September 20, 2012). 
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equivalent for 2020.69  The Guangdong cap has most likely left room for emissions to grow in 
the coming years, and it will be important to know how allowances are to be allocated to better 
understand where the demand in the market will come from.70 
Given that there is a certain degree of competition between the pilot regions, Guangdong 
has set a great example for its counterparts by releasing draft guidelines early, having industry 
participants on board, and setting ambitious goals, especially in light of the plan’s inclusion of 
the electricity sector.  Moreover, being one of two provinces in the pilot, Guangdong has a 
combination of a very poor western part, a developed economic powerhouse in the Pearl River 
Delta, and northern and eastern parts that are more typical of interior China with a mixture of 
agriculture and industry.71  Jeff Swartz, the international policy director at the International 
Emissions Trading Association, has stated that “the Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin [pilots] 
may…have nice programs, but nothing that looks like it can be implemented across the country, 
because those are cities.  Guangdong mirrors all of China and therefore might be a very 
interesting place to test market mechanisms to reduce emissions.”72  All signs point to the 
province’s ambition, and perhaps ability, to build a more rigorous program than the other six 
regions, which could very well become the model for a national ETS in China.73 
Tianjin 
As the second wealthiest city in the country, Tianjin was recognized for its excellent 
performance in achieving energy efficiency during the 11th FYP period, exceeding the assigned 
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target by 1%.74  With challenging targets of energy efficiency increase of 18% and carbon 
intensity reduction by 17% lying ahead for the 12th FYP, Tianjin continues to improve the energy 
efficiency of the city and decouple economic growth from carbon intensive power production.75   
As previously mentioned, the Tianjin Climate Exchange (TCX) was established as early 
as 2008 under the partnership between Petro China, the Chicago Climate Exchange, and the 
Tianjin Property Rights Exchange.76  Over the years, TCX has gained valuable experience in the 
trading of various emissions rights, including GHGs and major pollutants such as sulphur 
dioxide and COD.77  In December 2011, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved a grant 
of $750,000 for designing the Tianjin ETS, which has attracted both international and domestic 
experts to develop the scheme, from preparation to implementation.78  The ADB grant also 
included a timeline: obtain approval of feasibility study for the Tianjin ETS by NDRC and the 
Tianjin Municipal Government by December 2012, complete the prerequisites for the initiation 
of the Tianjin ETS by June 2013, and launch the Tianjin ETS by December 2013.79  Tianjin’s 
draft ETS rules governing the period from 2013 to 2015 were released on April 8 of this year, 
which covers about 635 companies that have emitted over 20,000 tons of CO2 in any year since 
2009.80  The sectors included in the Tianjin ETS are steel, chemicals, electricity, heat, 
petrochemical, oil and gas, mining, and construction.81  The cap will be determined annually for 
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each of the three years, although the exact start date for trading is not yet known.82  Participants 
in the Tianjin ETS may use CCERs, but for no more than 10% of their annual emissions.83  It 
was also reported that there is no ban on using credits from outside the borders of Tianjin, which 
could open the door to CER trading, possibly analogous to those now traded in the EU ETS.84  
Ultimately the hope is that Tianjin’s pilot ETS will “provide valuable lessons for the design of a 
nationwide system to reduce the carbon intensity of the Chinese economy.”85 
Shenzhen 
As China’s first—and one of the most successful—Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 
Shenzhen, situated in Guangdong province, operates at the sub-provincial division level, and has 
the same power as any provincial capital city in terms of policy making in economics and law.86  
Shenzhen was assigned an energy efficiency increase target of 7.84% and a carbon intensity 
reduction target of 15% under the 12th FYP.87   
In April of this year, Shenzhen’s mayor Qin Xu announced that its ETS pilot will start 
trading on June 17, 2013, the first precise start date among the country’s regional carbon trading 
schemes.88  The Shenzhen ETS will initially include 638 companies, which discharged 31.7 
million tons of GHGs in 2010, representing 38% of the city’s total.89  The scheme will eventually 
expand to include transportation, manufacturing and construction companies.90  However, no 
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information has been made publicly available regarding other aspects of the scheme such as the 
overall cap or allocation methods. 
Shanghai 
China’s financial center Shanghai, following in Shenzhen’s footsteps, has announced that 
it will launch its ETS this June, though no specific date was set.91  Manufacturers of steel, 
petrochemicals and electricity with annual carbon emissions of at least 20,000 tons are included 
in the Shanghai ETS, involving about 200 companies in 16 industries that dispensed 110 million 
tons of carbon dioxide annually.92  The list includes China’s state-owned oil companies 
PetroChina and Sinopec, as well as companies in the aviation sector, such as China Eastern 
Airlines and Shanghai Airlines.93  Detailed guidelines for monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV) have been issued for aviation, electricity, steel manufacturing, non-ferrous metals, textile, 
paper and non-metallic mineral production sectors.94  The Shanghai Environment Energy 
Exchange (SEEEX), recently restructured as a limited corporation where State Grid and the 
China Clean Development Mechanism Fund are amongst the shareholders, has been identified as 
the trading center to implement the scheme.95 
Hubei Province 
Home to the famous Three Gorges Dams, Hubei province was specially mentioned by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China as having done an outstanding job in exceeding its energy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Shanghai Joins Shenzhen in Announcing Start of Carbon Trade, CLEANBIZ.ASIA (April 11, 
2013). 
92 Id. 
93 Id.; Shanghai Includes Airlines in Carbon Trading Scheme, Issues MRV Guidelines, CLIMATE 
CONNECT NEWS (January 9, 2012). 
94 CLIMATE CONNECT NEWS, supra note 92. 
95 YU, supra note 21, at 20. 
 
 
	   18	  
efficiency target by 1.67% during the 11th FYP.96  For the ensuing five-year period, Hubei was 
assigned an energy efficiency target of 16% and a carbon intensity reduction target of 17% from 
2010 levels.97 
Hubei’s pilot ETS, set to launch in the second half of 2013, will cover about 150 
companies across eight sectors, regulating around 35% of the province’s total emissions.98  
These companies will be given free permits, and CCER offset credits are allowed to meet up to 
15% of their cap.99  The Hubei government will set aside 15% of the total amount of permits it 
will hand out in a reserve for new facilities that may come online after the ETS has started, but 
the newcomers may only use CCERs to meet 10% of their targets.100  Unlike in Tianjin, the use 
of offsets generated outside Hubei’s borders are prohibited, which means the companies cannot 
use CERs.101  An interesting detail included in the draft rules for Hubei’s ETS is that offsets from 
tree planting are preferred.102  This reflects the legacy and represents a continuation of the 
forestry carbon sink project that has been in place within the province since 2008.103 
Chongqing 
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Alongside Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, Chongqing is one of China’s four direct-
controlled municipalities, located inland in the southwest.104  The Chongqing DRC has asked the 
Chongqing United Assets and Equity Exchange to set up a trading platform and provide trading 
software.105  The Chongqing ETS is expected to launch later this year, covering six industrial 
sectors—electrolytic aluminum, ferroalloy, calcium carbide, caustic soda, cement, and iron and 
steel.106  The DRC is also in the process of launching a statistical system to determine the 
baseline carbon emissions of the entities covered which will then be used for allocation of 
emission allowances.107   
Inter-Provincial Collaboration 
As can be seen, each of the seven regional carbon trading schemes offers something 
unique, a result of the province or city tailoring policies to suit its own circumstances.  Indeed, 
one of the advantages of developing a range of pilots is that different approaches can be tested to 
see which will work in a Chinese context.  That being said, it would be unusual if the designers 
of the various schemes did not collaborate to some extent, as they will all be facing similar 
challenges and may benefit greatly from sharing their ideas.108  The prize for early collaboration 
might be that pilot schemes can be linked together creating a larger, more liquid market in the 
long term.109  Intentions to link schemes have been touched upon in a White Paper published by 
the State Council Information Office, reporting on the government’s intentions to gradually 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Geography of China’s Municipalities, available at 
http://geography.about.com/od/chinamaps/tp/china-municipalities.htm.  








	   20	  
establish trans-provincial and trans-regional ETSs.110  Authorities in Guangdong and Hubei, the 
only two provinces among the seven pilot programs, have already expressed interest in cross-
provincial trading to potentially start in 2014.111 
Hopes for a National ETS and a Global Carbon Market 
As mentioned at the end of Section II, the central government has expressed a desire to 
set up a national ETS by the end of the 12th FYP period, hopefully through the successful 
implementation and linking of the seven regional pilots.  Indeed, according to a recent speech 
given by NDRC’s deputy chair Xie Zhenhua, China is considering introducing a target to cap its 
overall carbon emissions as early as 2016 in its 13th FYP (2016-2020), though no final decision 
has been made.112  NDRC is also actively looking at 2025 as the year in which China will hit 
peak carbon emissions, while previous predictions have all hovered around 2030 and beyond.113  
Though some observers and policy researchers prefer to be more conservative about the pace of 
change in China, the Chinese government’s determination to “take a low-carbon path” is 
unmistakable,114 and a very real possibility exists that someday, various municipal, provincial 
and regional trading schemes will be combined into a nationwide system.   
Moreover, there is little doubt that China would have an eye on the future potential 
integration with other existing international carbon trading systems such as the EU ETS, or other 
regional ones in the Asian Pacific rim, such as in Japan and Australia.115  The World Bank 
estimates that carbon trading globally could be worth $3.5 trillion by 2020, meaning it would 
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overtake oil to become the world’s largest market.116  If China does manage to establish a 
functional national ETS, it would be far and away the largest carbon emissions trading scheme in 
the world, thereby providing the basis for the emergence of a global carbon market.117 
IV. Challenges Ahead and Possible Solutions 
Even though future prospects for carbon trading in China seems incredibly promising, it 
is important to keep in mind that currently, all seven pilot carbon emissions trading schemes are 
still in their infancy.  There remain many stumbling blocks, some particular to China, others 
shared by carbon trading schemes worldwide, which must be overcome before a meaningful 
national scheme can be implemented.  Some of the main challenges and their possible solutions 
are explored individually in the subsections that follow. 
Emissions Cap: Absolute or Intensity-Based? 
The departure point for any emissions trading scheme, no matter the size or scope, is 
setting an emissions cap.  The current state of the EU ETS is a warning to all that a cap set at an 
inappropriate level would cause it to function ineffectively.118  Aside from determining a specific 
number, a perhaps more important question for China is whether the cap should be absolute or 
intensity-based.  An absolute carbon cap has the advantage of making emission reductions 
predictable by fixing reductions up front.119  On the other hand, a carbon intensity cap, while 
reducing environmental certainty, is less controversial within China because it is seen as more 
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compatible with the needs for continued GDP growth.120  Though there is not yet a consensus 
within the country, several Chinese officials have surprisingly spoken up for the necessity of 
setting an absolute cap.121  Moreover, in an article published in Qiushi—the Chinese Communist 
Party flagship magazine—an influential government think tank recognized that an absolute cap is 
fundamental, stating that “it is only under an absolute emissions cap that carbon emission 
permits will become a scarce resource and possess the qualities of a commodity.”122   
As previously discussed in this paper, so far all targets contained in the FYPs have been 
efficiency- and intensity-based, though Guangdong has set an absolute cap of 660 million tons of 
CO2 in 2015, in line with its 12th FYP target to reduce carbon intensity by 19.5%.123  A key 
question in converting intensity or efficiency targets into an absolute number of tons is what 
assumptions to include about the likely economic growth over the period and also the expected 
trends in energy production and consumption.124  It has been suggested that one way to protect 
the market from a higher or lower than expected growth rate is to set a portion of the emissions 
allowance to one side to be released into the market only if certain conditions are met.125  There 
has been talk about including such a design in the Beijing ETS,126 which will make the setting of 
the cap easier to get right since it allows for adjustments to supply to be made in a clear and 
transparent manner.127   
Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) 
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To ensure that an emissions trading scheme runs smoothly, all market participants must 
have confidence that what they are trading is genuine, which in turn places a high degree of 
importance on MRV.  The lack of reliable carbon emissions data makes it difficult to set a 
realistic cap, creating the risk that emission limits will be set either too high or too low.128  
Although most provinces and cities in China have energy-saving supervision centers which 
oversee the reporting of energy use statistics by high-consuming companies, businesses do not 
usually itemize their data.129  And since energy audits are still uncommon, data verification 
proves extremely hard to carry out.130  In the words of an official working on the Tianjin ETS, 
“top-down calculations and bottom-up calculations don’t match up.  Neither do the figures from 
industry associations and those from emission in inventories.”131  For example, last year, 
scientists compared Chinese CO2 emissions as calculated using bottom-up data from the 30 
provincial statistics bureaus.132  For 2010, the bottom-up figure was larger by an amount 
equivalent to the total annual CO2 emissions of Japan, about 5% of the global total.133  Without 
accurate numbers, the first deal of the Guangdong trading scheme was based on expected future 
carbon emissions, rather than historical data.134   
The country needs to develop and enforce proper legislation and regulations to measure, 
report, and verify carbon emissions from industrial sites.  It needs to build an effective and 
accountable regulatory framework to oversee the reporting and trading of carbon credits.  Most 
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urgently, China needs to look at how it collects and analyzes data on carbon emissions in order to 
establish (or more optimistically, re-establish) credibility.135  China should make data relating to 
emissions and submissions of allowances open to the public so that third parties and competitors 
can assist in checking for irregularities and detecting fraud.136 
Admittedly, some infrastructure does exist in the country for measuring pollution such as 
sulphur oxides and energy consumption, including a handful of designated third-party 
verification companies determined by NDRC.137  Realizing that this is woefully insufficient to 
support the implementation of a carbon trading scheme, China has recently started developing 
the MRV framework.  In October 2010, China said at the fourth round of the UN climate talks in 
Tianjin that it is working on an up-to-date, national greenhouse emission database, the first 
publicly available database to include provincial level data since 1994.138  Moreover, NDRC has 
made it a priority to improve GHG emissions data at the provincial level by training 
professionals in verification and registry creation.139 
Which Sectors? 
Another area to consider is which economic sectors to include in a carbon emissions 
trading scheme.  It is important to take into account the future growth rate of any given sector—
more than half of the Chinese pilot programs are covering cement and steel, because the growth 
rates of these sectors would start to decline in the near future, and they are therefore less 
controversial.140  Some are also concerned with carbon leakage,141 which is defined as the 
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increase in emissions outside a region as a direct result of the policy to cap emission in this 
region.142  In a system that begins only with regional coverage, it is sensible to start with sectors 
which do not compete for business with operators in uncapped regions, or sectors that are less 
mobile.143  It does not appear that the issue of carbon leakage has been addressed or even 
mentioned in any of the draft plans released by the regional pilots. 
Some Chinese ETS studies have suggested that energy intensive sectors and large 
emitters, such as the electricity sector, should be incorporated into trading programs first.144  
According to the Energy Research Institute (ERI), two of China’s top five power companies 
(Datang and Guodian) have started piloting GHG emissions measurement and reporting in 
preparation for future trading.145  However, carbon trading involving the electricity sector raises 
a problem specific to China: the wholesale and retail prices of electricity are currently set by 
NDRC, which is good for reliability but would limit the ability of a power plant to absorb a 
carbon price by passing on higher costs to customers.146  Carbon trading in this sector may place 
an unduly taxing burden on Chinese power companies, especially given that some of them are 
already operating at a loss due to rises in energy commodity prices without corresponding 
increases to the electricity price.147  Some have advocated for a reform in the electricity pricing 
system in China so that power plants have the flexibility to purchase electricity at varied price 
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levels.148  Others have suggested that price regulation should be adjusted to reflect the new costs 
of carbon that will be included in the production of electricity.149  Since the exact price of carbon 
in trading cannot be known in advance, the regulator will need to predict what level of increase 
to allow.150  This calls for design features in the trading pilots which help to regulate price by 
adjusting the supply of allowances into the market.151  For example, if a fixed volume of 
allowances are set aside and only released into the market if prices reach a certain level, then the 
regulator has a better idea of what the maximum price will reach in the market and what the 
increase should be.152 
 
 
Emissions Allowance Allocation 
In a Chinese context, how should emissions allowances be efficiently and fairly 
distributed, on both provincial and firm levels?  With different economic structures and growth 
rates, substantial difference exists in energy consumption and carbon emissions across Chinese 
provinces.153  For example, in 2008, the province with the highest GDP (Guangdong) had a 
carbon intensity six times higher than the province with the lowest GDP (Tibet).154  Given the 
wide economy and emission intensity discrepancy of Chinese provinces, allocating emissions 
rights will be far from straightforward.  On an individual business level, the pilot locations 
expressed concerns about the lack of a uniform methodology for making allocations among 
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firms.155  An excessively simple approach could penalize firms that are already performing well 
by creating a situation where firms with historically high emission levels get higher quotas, while 
their more energy-efficient counterparts are given less room for maneuver.156  Some researchers 
have suggested using the benchmark system applied in the EU ETS, where quotas are allocated 
according to a company’s energy efficiency, but this requires a lot of basic data on company-
level emissions, which again highlights how critical it is to solve the MRV problem in China.157 
  There are of course other critical issues begging to be addressed: China currently lacks a 
robust system of supporting legislation that provides for adjudication of inevitable carbon trading 
disputes, along with regulatory and auditing bodies vested with clearly defined powers that allow 
them to enforce said legislation and resolve issues promptly.158  China is also toying with the 
idea of a carbon tax, which would provide a fixed price for the period during which a mature and 
nationwide carbon market develops.159  Alternatively, during these early stages of setting up 
carbon trading schemes, it might be advisable to impose a price floor and ceiling to prevent 
economic or other uncertain factors from seriously affecting the carbon market.160  Further 
research should also be done on the feasibility of tethering sulphur, nitrogen and particulate 
pollution—especially PM2.5 pollution—to carbon emissions rights, adding to the value of 
carbon trading and further reducing pollution.161  More generally, there is widespread uncertainty 
about whether a carbon-trading scheme—meant to be a strong market-based instrument—can 
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function well without a fully-developed, mature free-market economy.162  All of the above-
mentioned concerns and issues would have profound implications on the operation of a carbon 
market in China, even with good rules and design.   
Support and advice from international communities with expertise is not only welcome 
but also critical to the success of China’s fledgling carbon emissions trading schemes.  
Specifically, lawyers from the U.S. and Europe could advise corporate executives and financiers 
in China on how to effectively manage an emissions portfolio, considering that the latter possess 
no such practical knowledge since the government sets all the prices.163  Moreover, GHG trading 
experts from abroad should provide insight into design choices that could profoundly impact 
linkability of these individual schemes, bearing in mind the desirability of eventually linking a 
Chinese national carbon market with other international systems.164  Finally, financial support 
such as the ADB grant mentioned in the Tianjin ETS subsection would always be helpful in 
attracting legal experts within the country to design trading rules and regulatory framework. 
V. Conclusion 
China has embarked on a sincere and ambitious journey to use emissions trading as one 
means of reducing its carbon emissions and realizing “green growth.”  The factors driving 
China’s determination are two-fold.  Internally, the Chinese authorities are acutely aware that 
environmental pressures can overflow into social unrest and political catastrophe, and therefore 
any future growth must be done in a sustainable manner.  Furthermore, an understanding is 
taking root within the country that market-based mechanisms can combine high levels of 
ambition with sufficient flexibility to allow regulated sectors to adapt and innovate, thereby 
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reducing cost and increasing the efficiency of China’s efforts to reach carbon and energy 
intensity goals.165  Externally, as climate change increasingly dominates the global agenda, 
countries such as the United States have been pointing to China’s soaring emissions as a reason 
to drag their feet and hold back on ambition.166  Similarly, countries such as Japan and South 
Korea are hesitant to move forward unilaterally for fear that their international competitiveness 
will be undermined.167  As this paper hopefully illustrates, China is very serious in its efforts to 
redirect its economy onto a low carbon pathway.  Having already made great strides in this area 
by forming a national directive and tentative timeline and initiating regional pilots, the coming 
five years will be an intensive period of experimentation with carbon trading schemes.  The hope 
is that a carbon trading system will be economically advantageous compared to the 
administrative methods used in the 11th FYP.  Despite the myriad barriers and challenges 
confronting it along the way, China’s genuine resolve and the “crossing the river by feeling the 
stones” spirit will serve it remarkably well in establishing its own unique kind of carbon market 
that would transform its economy into a global low carbon leader. 
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